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Voting for History: One Person, One
Vote and the Creation of National
Register Historic Districts
Jonathan Stark-Sachs*
INTRODUCTION

It is a fundamental principle of our democratic society that the
right to vote is enjoyed by citizens, not “trees or acres,” “not farms
or cities or economic interests.” 1 So important is this fundamental
interest that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment requires courts to examine with the utmost scrutiny
the possible debasement of a citizen’s right to vote.2 Not only does
the right to vote require guarantees of free and unimpaired access
to the polls, but also that each eligible citizen’s vote be counted with
the same weight as every other’s, irrespective of race, sex, creed, or
even wealth.3 The requirement of “one person, one vote” was
instantiated in a line of United States Supreme Court
jurisprudence that extended the principle to the most local level of
governments and elections,4 recognizing that no election is so
unimportant as to justify the disenfranchisement or franchise

* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Roger Williams University School of Law, 2021;
Candidate for Master of Science in Historic Preservation, Roger Williams
University, 2022; B.A., Emporia State University, 2016. Thank you to Dr.
Christopher J. Ryan, Professor Diana Hassel, Dr. Justin Kishbaugh, and Kelly
Fanizzo for the helpful comments, guidance, and assistance.
1. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
2. See id.
3. See id. at 562, 568.
4. See Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 484–85 (1968).
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dilution of those who wish to lend their voice to the democratic
process.5
The Court, however, recognized that there were limited
circumstances in which the adaptability of democratic mechanisms
to uniquely localized needs was necessary to provide for the
functions of local governments and allowed escape from the
strictures of the “one person, one vote” principle. 6 Professor
Richard Briffault termed this model of local election the
“proprietary” model because the Court cemented this model in an
analogy to “the voting arrangements of a private corporation or a
cooperative.”7
The National Park Service (NPS) has proposed a rule change
to modify the objection process for the nomination of historic
districts to the National Register of Historic Places (National
Register).8
In addition to the existing majority landowner
standard, this proposed rule would provide an alternative standard
that values each property owner’s vote to object to the listing of the
proposed historic district based on the “land area” that they own
within it.9 Diluting smaller property owner’s votes in this objection
process would violate the guarantees of “one person, one vote”
unless it could be found that elections for National Register historic
districts were of the type that did not require its application.
However, the land-area voting scheme proposed by the NPS
has fundamental differences to the kind of election that justified
departure from “one person, one vote.” Firstly, the foundation of
the proprietary model rests on principles of federalism that promote
adaptability in local government, and, as such, a federal agency
utilizing this model runs counter to the core distinctions justifying
its creation. Furthermore, the proposed rule invades spheres of
5. See Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 55 (1970).
6. Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S.
719, 727–28 (1973) (quoting Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 56
(1970)).
7. Richard Briffault, Who Rules at Home?: One Person/One Vote and
Local Governments, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 339, 365–66, 369–70 (1993). The Court
explicitly justified the use of this model on an election for a local government
body because it was “essentially a business enterpris[e].” See Ball v. James,
451 U.S. 355, 368 (1981).
8. See National Register of Historic Places, 84 Fed. Reg. 6996 (proposed
Mar. 1, 2019) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 60).
9. See id. at 6998.
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traditional state sovereignty and potentially runs afoul of discrete
federalism-based doctrines the Court has announced. Secondly,
even if applying federal control over local elections in this manner
is proper, the broad and egalitarian interests of the voters in
National Register historic district elections do not meet the
guidelines the Court has provided that make use of the proprietary
model permissible. As such, these elections must remain on a
substantially “one person, one vote” basis.
This Comment discusses the historical and regulatory
background of National Register historic districts and how the
proposed voting scheme would fit within the Court’s “one person,
one vote” jurisprudence. Part I examines the importance of historic
districts as a historic preservation tool and the regulatory
framework of the National Register. Part II discusses the
jurisprudence that gave rise to the two models of local elections.
Part III argues that, despite some differences in the voting process
for National Register historic districts, they are, nonetheless actual
elections; examines the federalism-based underpinnings of the
proprietary model of local elections and its implications on this
voting scheme; and further argues that these elections are entitled
to “one person, one vote” protections. The conclusion of this
Comment underscores these fundamental differences and
demonstrates that the elections must adhere to the traditional
democratic model.
I.

THE NATIONAL REGISTER AND HISTORIC DISTRICTS

The National Register defines a historic district as a
“geographically definable area, urban or rural, possessing a
significant concentration, linkage, or continuity of sites, buildings,
structures, or objects united by past events or aesthetically by plan
or physical development.”10 As of 2018, the National Register
includes over ten thousand historic districts. 11 National Register
historic districts, and historic districts in general, occupy a unique
and important place in the historic preservation landscape, yet they
are also complicated by the diverse interests of the property owners
within the district. To account for these interests, the National
10. 36 C.F.R. § 60.3(d) (2019).
11. NORMAN TYLER, ILENE R. TYLER & TED J. LIGIBEL, HISTORIC
PRESERVATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO ITS HISTORY, PRINCIPLES, AND PRACTICE 73
(3d ed. 2018).
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Register regulations provide private property owners within the
proposed historic district the opportunity to object to the listing in
a local referendum.12 The current regulations adhere closely to the
“one person, one vote” principle and, as such, reflect popular ideals
of democratic equality.13
A. Importance of Historic Districts
Historic districts are unique because they have not only the
potential to preserve a place but also frame preservation on a
neighborhood scale by establishing a sense of place as well. One of
the most important aspects of understanding and appreciating
history is context. Indeed, one of the factors when assessing the
historical significance of a potential listing and its corresponding
integrity is its setting.14 While the setting and surroundings are
certainly to be considered in a single property listing, in a historic
district, the association of the constituent parts and the resulting
unity of the historical narrative is paramount. 15 By widening the
scope of historic preservation, historic districts emphasize the
importance of urban and societal orientation that can be lost when
focusing on a single resource.
Although the focus on distilling a certain historical period
typifies many historic districts and necessitates the selection of a
certain history over others, historic districts also represent a
potential to incorporate broader historical narratives. 16 It is
undeniable that urban landscapes continue to evolve, and while
some historic districts pride themselves on representing high-style
12. See 36 C.F.R. § 60.6(g) (2019).
13. See Thomas W. Merrill, Direct Voting by Property Owners, 77 U. CHI.
L. REV. 275, 278–81 (2010) (noting that where local direct democracy decisions
are made on a “one person, one vote” basis, the result has greater democratic
legitimacy and fairness given that conflicting values inevitably result in
winners and losers.).
14. TYLER ET AL., supra note 11, at 97. “Integrity” is the lens through which
a nomination is viewed to determine whether the property is still capable of
effectively conveying the historical significance that qualifies it for the
National Register. See infra note 36.
15. See DAVID A. HAMER, HISTORY IN URBAN PLACES: THE HISTORIC
DISTRICTS OF THE UNITED STATES 35 (1998).
16. See id. at 26. “Within a total city context, historic districts can preserve
a sense of the architectural and historical continuum of the life of that city,
even if one district viewed in isolation may appear to be confined artificially to
just one era.” Id.
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architecture, historic districts can also encompass diverse resources
that display a frenetic urban narrative.17 In addition, as the field
of historic preservation itself continues to shift focus to
representing the full American experience, historic districts will
undoubtedly play a role in interpreting overlooked resources.18
Whether by conforming to existing aesthetics or by incorporating
diverse buildings into the greater chronology of the city, historic
districts are a unique catalyst and building block in the evolution
of their urban setting.
Beyond their importance to aesthetic concerns and urban
growth, historic districts can also provide a vehicle for effective city
planning and cultivating social capital. Urban historic districts are
singularly positioned to take advantage of state and federal tax
incentive programs because they both encompass a variety of
resources and often have the potential for mixed-use commercial
redevelopment targeted by such programs. 19 Likewise, historic
districts have the potential to benefit property values by appealing
to those who appreciate a historic aesthetic or a more walkable
neighborhood.20 Above all, historic districts enable communities to
breathe new life into entire neighborhoods through finding
continuing uses for “vacant, unused, or underutilized historic
buildings” by incentivizing new commercial developments and
creating a renewed tax base. 21 Critics argue that the benefits of
historic districts may not outweigh the costs, that historic
preservation is used as a pretext to gentrify and exclude low-income
residents, and that it blocks much needed development in urban
areas, but the consensus remains that historic districts are

17. See Robin Elisabeth Datel, Preservation and a Sense of Orientation for
American Cities, 75 GEOGRAPHICAL REV. 125, 128 (1985).
18. See Adam Lovelady, Broadened Notions of Historic Preservation and
the Role of Neighborhood Conservation Districts, 40 URBAN LAW. 147, 149–51
(2008).
19. See Datel, supra note 17, at 132. The Federal Rehabilitation Tax
Credit in particular requires that the property be income-producing. See TYLER
ET AL., supra note 11, at 306.
20. See TYLER ET AL, supra note 11, at 302−03.
21. Id. at 302.
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beneficial to the aesthetic, communal, and economic fabric of
neighborhoods.22
The historic preservation profession has recognized the many
benefits of historic districts and has increasingly moved toward
preserving historic resources on a neighborhood scale. 23 Indeed,
the historic district is arguably the marquee tool for achieving the
goal of using “structures and objects of the past to establish the
values of time and place” that catalyzed the modern preservation
movement.24 Although the most pronounced of these benefits
result from local historic districts, with their stronger regulatory
power,25 the National Register and its nomination process provide
for a uniform program that can help facilitate local historic districts’
creation and provides for its own attendant benefits. 26
B. The National Register and the Nomination Process
The National Register was created as part of the National
Historic Preservation Act of 1966 (NHPA) and functions as a list of
heretofore recognized historic resources.27 It also provides a
process to determine what is and what is not considered historically
significant and therefore deserving of recognition and
preservation.28 Although the National Register is a federally
funded program overseen by the NPS, it is largely administered by
State Historic Preservation Officers (SHPO) in each state 29 and fits
a model of “cooperative federalism.”30
22. See Alexander Kazam, From Independence Hall to the Strip Mall:
Applying Cost-Benefit Analysis to Historic Preservation, 47 ENVTL. L. 429, 432–
34 (2017).
23. See HAMER, supra note 15, at 136−39.
24. See Datel, supra note 17, at 125 (quoting UNITED STATES CONFERENCE
OF MAYORS, WITH HERITAGE SO RICH 207 (1966)).
25. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (establishing that the
regulation of aesthetics was permissible as part of a state’s police power to
promote the health, safety, and welfare of its communities).
26. See TYLER ET AL., supra note 11, at 144.
27. See id. at 70.
28. See id. at 70–71, 77−80, 95–97.
29. See id. at 77–78. On tribal land the program may be overseen by a
Tribal Historic Preservation Officer or THPO. See id. at 79.
30. See ANTHONY J. BELLIA, JR., FEDERALISM 209–10 (2011). Cooperative
federalism provides for state implementation of federal programs, subject to
minimum federally-proscribed requirements. Id.
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The NHPA and the establishment of the National Register
represented a paradigm shift in how historic preservation
functioned in the United States. Previous preservation efforts were
largely led by volunteer organizations, and previous legislation
protecting cultural resources was much more limited in scope.31
The National Register sought a more holistic approach to expand
the types of resources that could be recognized federally. 32 Indeed,
the NHPA was the first federal act that allowed for the designation
of historic districts.33 In addition to the nationally significant
properties already recognized under previous laws, the National
Register also allowed for the inclusion of properties of state and
local significance, opening the door for a more comprehensive and
widespread program.34 To be listed, however, a property must first
go through the National Register’s nomination process.
1.

The Current Nomination Process

Any party may prepare a nomination for a property’s inclusion
on the National Register even without the owner’s knowledge or
consent.35 In each state, the SHPO evaluates the nomination under
the National Register criteria for historic significance and may
officially nominate the property.36 The SHPO is also responsible
for overseeing the majority of the ensuing process.37 Although the
National Register originally did not require owner consent for a

31. See TYLER ET AL., supra note 11, at 37–40, 42, 50.
32. See BARRY MACKINTOSH, NATIONAL HISTORIC PRESERVATION ACT AND
THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE: A HISTORY 20–22 (1986).
33. TYLER ET AL., supra note 11, at 72–73. The National Register also
encompasses “districts, sites, buildings, structures, and objects significant in
American history, architecture, archeology, engineering and culture.” 36
C.F.R. § 60.1(a) (2019).
34. See MACKINTOSH, supra note 32, at 21.
35. See id. at 45, 48.
36. To be listed, all nominations must show historical significance through
one or more of four criteria: (a) association with important events, (b)
association with important persons, (c) architectural or artistic merit, or (d)
potential to yield important information in prehistory or history. 36 C.F.R. §
60.4 (2019). In addition, a nomination is evaluated to determine whether the
property can properly convey that historic significance through “integrity” of
location, design, setting, materials, workmanship, feeling, and association.
TYLER ET AL., supra note 11, at 97.
37. See TYLER ET AL., supra note 11, at 109−10.
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property to be listed,38 the NHPA and regulations now provide that
the property owner must be notified and have the opportunity to
object to the nomination.39
If a property owner objects to the nomination, then the
property will be evaluated for eligibility for inclusion in the
National Register, but will not be listed unless the objection is
withdrawn.40 For historic districts, a nomination will not be listed
if the majority of the property owners within the proposed district
object.41 Each property owner has “one vote regardless of how
many properties or what part of one property that party owns and
regardless of whether the property contributes to the significance
of the district.”42 The one landowner, one vote election was selected
because it was the “most reasonable and legally defensible” manner
to consider property owner objections.43
Property owners are often concerned that the listing of their
property on the National Register will result in a legal restriction
placed upon their property, and therefore, object to the listing.44
Listing on the National Register, however, does not automatically
impose any restrictions on the property; the owner is still free to
modify or even demolish their historic property.45 Some states and

38. MACKINTOSH, supra note 32, at 45.
39. See 54 U.S.C. § 302105(b) (2014); National Register of Historic Places,
36 C.F.R. § 60.6(c), (g) (2019). The SHPO will obtain a list of property owners
to notify based on either the official land records or tax records. 36 C.F.R. §
60.6(c) (2019). Property owners who wish to object are required to submit a
notarized statement to the SHPO certifying that they are the sole or partial
property owner. Id. at § 60.6(g).
40. 36 C.F.R. § 60.6(s) (2019).
41. Id. at § 60.6(g). It is the responsibility of the SHPO to “ascertain”
whether the majority of property owners have objected. Id.
42. Id.
43. National Register of Historic Places, 46 Fed. Reg. 56183, 56186 (Nov.
16, 1981).
44. See TYLER, supra note 11, at 110.
45. See 36 C.F.R. § 60.2(a) (2019). The listing of a property on, or a
determination of eligibility for, the National Register does afford consideration
of effects to the property stemming from federally funded or permitted
undertakings through the Section 106 process of the NHPA, which could also
potentially involve a reliance on private funds where the property owner
himself seeks federal benefits. See id.; see also MACKINTOSH, supra note 32, at
45. Listing also disincentivizes the demolition of the property by making it
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localities have set up complementary programs that result in a
simultaneous listing on a state register,46 which, in turn, may come
with some property restrictions.47 Yet, these decisions are made at
the state and local level with greater opportunity for selfdetermination and do not implicate these restrictions on the
National Register program. In essence, National Register status is
an honorific that can come with considerable benefits to the
property owners and communities in which those properties are
located but carries no per se impairments on those property owners
who do not support its preservation purpose.
Whether the property owner supports, objects, or remains
silent on the nomination, if the SHPO determines that the property
may be eligible, the nomination then proceeds to the accompanying
state review board for further evaluation. 48 Once approved at the
state level, the application is then sent to the Keeper of the National
Register, under the auspices of the Secretary of the Interior, who
reviews the application.49 If the Keeper of the National Register
agrees with the state review board, the nomination becomes
officially listed on the National Register and is published in the
Federal Register, or, if the property owner(s) object, there is only a
determination of eligibility. 50 Under the proposed voting scheme,
this objection process will largely remain the same, but by valuing
each landowner’s vote in proportion to the land area that they
control, it brings into question the fundamental democratic equality
of the election.
2.

Proposed Land-Area Voting Scheme

The proposed regulatory changes to the National Register
program were prompted in part by the 2016 amendments to the
NHPA, but the land-area voting scheme was not related to the
ineligible for certain tax benefits for demolishing historic buildings otherwise
available but does not prevent the demolition itself. See § 60.2(c).
46. Sara C. Bronin & Ryan Rowberry, HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAW IN A
NUTSHELL 66 (2d ed. 2018).
47. See TYLER ET AL., supra note 11, at 127–28.
48. Id. at 109. State review boards are comprised of experts in various
professions including history, architectural history, historic architecture,
archaeology, and other related disciplines. 36 C.F.R. § 60.3(o) (2019).
49. TYLER ET AL., supra note 11, at 109.
50. Id.
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amendments. 51
In fact, the NHPA provision providing for
landowner objection remained unchanged and provides only for
objection by a “majority of the [property] owners.”52 Yet, in addition
to the existing objection criteria, the proposed rule would allow for
a nomination to be blocked on objection of “the owners of a majority
of the land area.”53 Although the language does not explicitly value
a property owner’s vote based off the land area that they own, such
is the natural consequence of the rule. If this rule were to be
adopted, then those with the largest land holdings within the
district could veto the National Register nomination over the
majority of smaller landowners whose franchise has been diluted
by the rule.54
The NPS contends that the land-area voting scheme will
“further emphasize the rights of private property owners within a
proposed historic district.”55 While this may be true for larger
landowners, it is most certainly not true for their smaller neighbors.
This rule would subordinate the rights of one private property
owner under another. Furthermore, assuming (as is necessary
because of the scant justifications given) that this change is meant
to remedy unwanted listing where state law creates burdensome
restrictions,56 the provision would be over-inclusive because it
51. National Register of Historic Places, 84 Fed. Reg. 6996 (proposed Mar.
1, 2019). There are other concerning proposed changes and potential
administrative deficiencies within the proposed rule change that are outside of
the scope of this Comment. See generally National Trust for Historic
Preservation, Comment Letter on National Park Service Proposed Rule for the
National
Register
of
Historic
Places
(Apr.
30,
2019),
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=NPS-2019-0001-3286
[https://perma.cc/XJW4-U47Y] [hereinafter National Trust Comment].
52. 54 U.S.C. § 302105(b) (2014) (emphasis added).
53. National Register of Historic Places, 84 Fed. Reg. 6996, 7002 (proposed
Mar. 1, 2019) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 60(g)).
54. See National Trust Comment, supra note 51, at 5.
55. Proposed Regulations on the Listing of Properties in the National
Register
of
Historic
Places,
NAT’L
PARK
SERV.,
https://www.nps.gov/subjects/historicpreservation/nhparegs2019.htm
[https://perma.cc/ZHY3-9AA5] (last visited Nov. 15, 2019).
56. See infra note 151. The land-area voting scheme may also be justified
on a general sense of fairness. It is only logical (as the argument would likely
go) that the owners representing the majority of the land in a proposed historic
district should govern the outcome, just as the overall majority of landowners
could do, because they have more gross ownership or “shares” of the land
(whether that be square feet, acres, etc.). The definition of “fairness,” however,
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provides a nationwide rule to a myriad of state contexts⎯even
where such restrictions are absent. As a result, larger landowners
would nevertheless be favored over their less-land-rich neighbors
without the justifiable concerns over property restrictions. Because
of the potential constitutional problems with the proposed voting
scheme, it must be viewed with the Court’s jurisprudence on
limiting a citizen’s franchise.
II. ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE

The Supreme Court first distilled the “one person, one vote”
principle of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment in Reynolds v. Sims.57 In its decision, the Court
articulated that the right to vote must be enjoyed by all similarly
situated citizens, and that vote must have substantially equal
weight on the outcome of the election.58 Furthermore, because the
right to vote is “preservative of other basic civil and political rights,”

can differ based on what proverbial yardstick is used, as will be seen in the
differing results on application of the democratic or proprietary model. See
infra Part II. Assuming that one adheres to the more specific ideal of
“democratic fairness,” the idea that those with greater relative wealth in the
form of land can dictate the result over a majority of their individual neighbors
is anything but fair⎯and is more akin to feudalism. See source cited infra note
151.
57. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964). While Reynolds and its
progeny exclusively apply the “one person, one vote” principle to state
elections, it equally applies to the federal government through the guarantee
of equal protection implicit in the Fifth Amendment of the United States’
Constitution. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498–99 (1954); see also
Kenneth L. Karst, The Fifth Amendment’s Guarantee of Equal Protection, 55
N.C. L. REV. 541, 543 (1977) (demonstrating a general rule of congruence in the
equal protection guarantees afforded by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments subject only to limited exceptions based on unique federal
functions). Although there are other federal elections, namely those for United
States Senate, that do not comport with the “one person, one vote” principle,
Reynolds itself rejected the “so-called federal analogy” in state elections. See
Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 574–76. The Court concluded that the unique historical
concerns surrounding our nation’s foundational compact and the state
sovereignty concessions necessary to achieve it were a deviation from basic
democratic principles of fairness. Id. As such, the “one person, one vote”
principle is inapplicable to some federal elections not because they are federal,
but because they are so described in the Constitution. See id. at 574.
58. Id. “The right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of
the weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free
exercise of the franchise.” Id. at 555.
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the Court must strictly scrutinize any infringement of that right.59
Therefore, to justify an unequal franchise, the government must
demonstrate that it had a compelling interest in tailoring voting
requirements and it narrowly tailored the election to achieve that
end.60 While the “one person, one vote” principle was first applied
to malapportionment in state legislative districts for federal and
state office, the Court soon applied the principle to the local
context.61
A. Local General-Purpose Governments and Elections
Avery v. Midland County was the first case to extend the “one
person, one vote” principle to local governments.62 Avery reviewed
the constitutionality of the voting system for the Midland County
Commissioners Court, which was elected from single-member
districts of vastly unequal population.63 The Court found that in
applying the “one person, one vote” principle, it was not relevant
what functions were exercised; rather, the relevant factor was that
the Commission had “authority to make a substantial number of
decisions that affect all citizens.”64 However, while the “one person,
one vote” principle applied to local governments with general
powers, it left the door open for localities to “devis[e] mechanisms
of local government suitable for local needs and efficient in solving
local problems.”65 Yet, in the wake of Avery, it was unclear where
59. Id. at 562.
60. See Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627–28 (1969).
61. See Briffault, supra note 7, at 345–46.
62. See Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 479 (1968).
63. Id. at 475–76. The three rural districts had a combined population of
2,094 whereas the single urban district had a population of 67,906. Id.
64. See id. at 482–84. The argument that the “one person, one vote”
principle applied only to sufficiently legislative bodies stemmed from Sailors
v. Board of Education, where, while assuming arguendo that “one person, one
vote” applied to local governments, the Court noted that the county board
functioned in a more “administrative” than “legislative” capacity but stressed
that the board positions were appointed by its constituent local boards rather
than from a direct vote. 387 U.S. 105, 110 (1967). The Court in Avery opined
that Sailors fit into the new local paradigm they had created, as an example of
their sympathies to local innovation, yet discounted the argument that the
Commissioners Court was “not sufficiently legislative.” See Avery, 390 U.S. at
482, 485 (internal quotations omitted).
65. See id. at 485. The governmental powers that the Commissioners
Court wielded included setting a tax rate, equalizing assessments, issuing
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the proper context for such a “special-purpose unit of government”
that justified departure from “one person, one vote,” would
emerge.66
The cases immediately following Avery further extended “one
person, one vote” to special government units and elections that
seemingly corresponded to only nominal general governmental
powers, including elections for local bond referenda67 and
educational boards. 68 Nevertheless, because these elections had
the potential to affect those who had been disenfranchised, the
Court found that they contravened the “one person, one vote”
principle.69
In City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, the Court examined a
referendum to approve the issuance of general obligation bonds
that excluded otherwise qualified voters who did not own real
property.70 The Court rejected that property owners bore a “special
burden” and assumed that costs would inevitably be passed on to
residents in the community.71 Therefore, “[p]resumptively, when
all citizens are affected in important ways by a governmental
decision subject to a referendum, the Constitution does not permit
weighted voting or the exclusion of otherwise qualified citizens from
the franchise.”72 Due to the presumption against interference with
a non-property owner’s franchise and the lack of a convincing
showing that property owners interests were sufficiently “different
from the interests of non[-]property owners,” the Court found the
exclusion in violation of “one person, one vote.”73
By extending “one person, one vote” to bond referenda, the
Court rejected the idea that the principle applied only to
bonds, and setting a budget for the allocation of the county’s funds. See id. at
483.
66. See id. at 483–84.
67. See City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 212–13 (1970);
Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 702–03 (1969).
68. See Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 52–3 (1970); Kramer v.
Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 622 (1969).
69. See, e.g., City of Phoenix, 399 U.S. at 215–18; Kramer, 395 U.S. at 630–
31.
70. City of Phoenix, 399 U.S. at 205–06.
71. See id. at 208–12.
72. See id. at 209.
73. See id. at 212–13.
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representative elections and, instead, held that it also governed
direct democracy.74 Furthermore, even if the outcome placed a
direct pecuniary burden on a certain voting class, the secondary
effects on public services and community-wide costs were sufficient
to place the disfavored citizens on equal footing in the election.75
In Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, the Court
reviewed an election process for local school district boards that
excluded voters who did not own or lease real property within the
district or did not have custody of a child enrolled in the local public
schools.76 While the Court reserved judgment on whether limiting
franchise to those “primarily interested” was a compelling state
interest, it held that the restriction improperly defined voter’s
interests and excluded those who were civically “interested” in local
education.77 This conceptualization did not rest only on pecuniary
interests but allowed for a more subjective rationale of interest that
included the voter’s specific viewpoint on the outcome of the
election.78 Additionally, the Court elaborated that this exacting
standard of scrutiny was triggered whenever the forum chose the
democratic method, even where another method would be
permissible. 79
Although the Court did not narrowly define what type of
mechanism would allow an election to differentiate the interests of
voters, it did provide for a powerful statement on democracy as a
tool for gauging community concern.80 A democratic system does
not allow for those who are indifferent to the issues implicated in a
local election to have a greater say than those who are informed and
passionate about the outcome without meeting a discerning
standard. 81

74. See id. at 215 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
75. See id. at 209–11 (majority opinion).
76. See Kramer, 395 U.S. at 622.
77. See id. at 630–31.
78. See id. at 631.
79. See id. at 629. “[O]nce the franchise is granted to the electorate, lines
may not be drawn which are inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. (quoting Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383
U.S. 663, 665 (1966)).
80. See id.
81. See id. at 633.
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Likewise, in Hadley v. Junior College District of Metropolitan
Kansas City, the Court invalidated the election scheme for a junior
college district’s six-member board of trustees based on districts of
unequal population.82 While not vested with the general powers
exercised in Avery, the Court nevertheless found the board’s powers
broad enough to require adherence to the “one person, one vote”
principle.83 Because the election concerned education, which was a
traditional local government function, it lent credence to the wide
impact on excluded voters.84 Furthermore, it was not permissible
to limit strict scrutiny only to “important” elections because the fact
that an election was the chosen method of decision-making is “a
strong indication that the choice is an important one.”85
Hadley provided a useful tool in the calculus of deciding
whether the election required equal franchise power by looking to
whether the governmental functions related to the election were
novel or those that local governments of general powers typically
exercise.86 Hadley also underscored the importance of elections as
a constitutionally protected method of decision-making that does
not allow any stratification by attempting to determine which types
of decisions were more important than others.87
Avery and the “one person, one vote” cases that immediately
followed demonstrated that strict scrutiny was necessary not
because of the “‘subject’ of the election, but because of the fact of an
election.”88 Those cases presumed that the vote would affect all
otherwise eligible voters in important ways, even where the burden
of or primary interest in the election seemingly fell more heavily on
those granted greater franchise.89 While the trend following Avery
seemed increasingly to extend the “one person, one vote” principle
to special-purpose districts and elections, the Court also
consistently acknowledged that it did not wish to place “roadblocks

82. Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 51–52 (1970).
83. See id. at 53–54.
84. See id. at 56.
85. See id. at 55.
86. See id. at 56.
87. See id.at 55.
88. See Briffault, supra note 7, at 354 (quoting Kramer v. Union Free Sch.
Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 629 (1969)) (emphasis added).
89. See id. at 359.
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in the path of innovation, experiment, and development” generally
afforded local governments under the federal system. 90 Making
good on this promise, the Court soon found occasion to explore a
model of election for a business-like special purpose district that
allowed escape from the strict scrutiny of “one person, one vote.”
B. Special Limited-Purpose Districts
In Salyer Land Company v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage
District, the Court found a district of “special limited purpose and
. . . disproportionate effect” on a favored group that justified escape
from the strictures of “one person, one vote.”91 The Court examined
elections for the board of directors of a water storage district, where
the franchise was restricted to landowners within the district and
votes were apportioned according the assessed valuation of the
land.92 The water district financed and operated storage works
within the district, which were assessed against the land therein in
accordance with the benefits to be received, and tolls were charged
for the use of the water.93 The district offered no general public
services, such as schools, transportation, utilities, or infrastructure,
that would widely impact all residents of the district. 94 Therefore,
because the “the benefits and burdens to each landowner . . . [were]
in proportion to the assessed value of the land[,]” there was a
rational basis for the state to value votes in this manner.95
By departing from strict scrutiny, which governed previous
local voting cases, the Court created an entirely new model for local
90. See Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 485 (1968); see also
Hadley, 397 U.S. 50, 59 (“[V]iable local governments may need many
innovations, numerous combinations of old and new devices, [and] great
flexibility in municipal arrangements to meet changing urban conditions.”)
(quoting Sailors v. Bd. of Educ., 387 U.S. 105, 110–11 (1967))).
91. Slayer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S.
719, 728 (1973).
92. Id. at 724–25.
93. Id. at 723–24, 729.
94. Id. at 728–29. However, the water district did have the power to
employ workers, condemn private properties, and authorize both general
obligation bonds (the kind extended “one person, one vote” protection in City of
Phoenix) and interest-bearing warrants. Id. at 728 n.7. Furthermore, the
water district engaged in flood control activities that had the potential to affect
all residents, but the Court found this “incidental” to the “primary purpose” of
water acquisition, storage, and distribution. Id. at 728 n.8.
95. Id. at 734.
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elections justified by comparing voter franchise to shares in a
private corporation.96 This proprietary model of local election was
not express, but instead outlined an emerging analysis that allowed
the Court to create a unique carveout for local elections to exercise
the kind of adaptability favored under the federal system. 97 The
Court further expanded on the understanding of this new model for
local elections in Ball v. James.98
In Ball, the Court reviewed another water district election for
which votes were restricted to landowners, but, unlike in Sayler,
this water district apportioned the franchise based on the acreage
owned.99 This water district had similar functions to the one in
Salyer, though it encompassed a substantial amount of urban land
and also sold hydroelectric power to hundreds of thousands of
people.100 Nevertheless, the Court found that the water district
“simply does not exercise the sort of governmental powers that
invoke the strict demands” of “one person, one vote.”101 Even
though the district’s electricity sales did widely effect all those
within the district, the court found that this was not an exercise of
a traditional government function necessitating “one person, one
vote” because the power service was merely incidental to the
primary purpose of the water district. 102 Instead, the Court viewed
the water district as “essentially a business enterpris[e] . . . created
by and chiefly benefitting a specific group of landowners.”103
As an elaboration of the electoral model created in Salyer, Ball
makes explicit the Court’s reliance on designating the election as
one for an essentially proprietary entity.104 In Ball, the Court
greatly expanded the scope of the proprietary model by allowing the
initial formation and structure of the district to outweigh the wide

96. See Briffault, supra note 7, at 365.
97. See id. at 366, 381.
98. See Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 357 (1981).
99. Id. at 359.
100. Id. at 357. While the water district in Salyer had only seventy-seven
residents, the water district at issue in Ball included “almost half the
population of the State.” Id. at 365.
101. Id. at 366.
102. See id. at 368–69.
103. Id. at 368.
104. See id.

216 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:199
impact on excluded voters by the later assumed public utility
function.105 The Court noted that to secure the initial buy-in of
larger landowners for the creation of the district, the investment
risk required a proportional control of the water district, and the
unequal franchise continued to be relevant to its primary
function.106
Unfortunately, neither Ball nor Salyer clearly delineated the
analysis by which this model of local election escaped from strict
judicial scrutiny, leaving lower courts and scholars unsure of the
legal framework by which to distinguish the democratic model from
the proprietary model.107 The two factors that the Court did
provide in distinguishing the two models were (1) the
disproportionate impact on those favored by the voting scheme and
(2) the special limited purpose of the district.108 Even in analyzing
the traditional functions of the water district in Ball, the Court
ignored its statement from Salyer that utilities are the type that
require adherence to “one person, one vote.”109 Furthermore,
rather than using these criteria to show a compelling need to tailor
local elections,110 as the Court could have done, it instead used
them to justify a less discerning review, abandoning the
presumptions of wide impact in City of Phoenix and broad
conceptualization of citizen interest in Kramer.111
III. NATIONAL REGISTER ELECTIONS UNDER “ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE”

While National Register historic districts occupy a unique and
important place in the federal government’s historic preservation
policy, it is not clear where and how the objection process for

105. See id. at 371.
106. See id.
107. See Briffault, supra note 7, at 370.
108. See Ball, 451 U.S. at 370.
109. See id. at 380 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare
Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 728–29 (1973)).
110. The local voting cases leading up to Salyer, and their frequent
invocation of the importance of innovation for local elections, suggest a
willingness to declare a compelling government interest. See supra note 90
and accompanying text. When the time finally came, the court did not do so,
but instead established these proprietary needs as a complete exception to
strict scrutiny. See Salyer, 410 U.S. at 728.
111. See Briffault, supra note 7, at 362.
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National Register historic districts fits into the “one person, one
vote” paradigms established in the Supreme Court’s decisions.
Therefore, it is necessary to evaluate to what extent the objection
process resembles the elections previously examined, both under
the existing democratic and proprietary models, as well as certain
fundamental differences due to the federal nature of the election
involved here.
A. National Register Historic District Objections Function as an
Election
Although there are clear differences in the impetus and
procedure that make up the objection process for National Register
historic districts from traditional local elections, the procedure is
an election by its very nature. As recognized under the democratic
model line of cases, where a democratic method is selected to render
the underlying decision, certain constitutional voting protections
and presumptions attach.112 These protections cannot be
ameliorated simply by an attempt to demonstrate that the decision
is less important than more traditional representative elections—
the fact that an election was chosen proves that the decision is an
important one.113 Furthermore, even if the decision to list a historic
district on the National Register is an “administrative” one, the
Court has disavowed such distinctions as being sufficient by
themselves to justify a departure from “one person, one vote”
protections.114
Neither is there any reason to view the manner in which the
objection process for National Register historic districts is
formulated as rendering the decision not an election, functionally
or constitutionally. Indeed, the Federal Register that established
the objection process explicitly referred to a property owner’s

112. See Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 54–55 (1970); Kramer v.
Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 629 (1969).
113. See Hadley, 397 U.S. at 55. The Court noted that the crafting of
judicial standards to defining the relative importance of elections would be
unfeasible, particularly considering that different values would render a “vital”
election to one voter as “routine” to another. Id.
114. See id. at 55–56. The Court emphasized that governmental activities
“cannot easily be classified in the neat categories favored by civics texts” and
to quantify the purpose of elections was judicially “unmanageable.” Id.
(quoting Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 482 (1968)).
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objection as a “vote,”115 and the proposed rule continues to do so.116
Furthermore, while the objection of the majority of the property
owners within the proposed district functions as a veto to its listing,
the procedure is nonetheless an election. 117 In Eastlake v. Forest
City Enterprises, Inc., the Court found that a referendum procedure
allowing citizens to effectively veto zoning modifications was a valid
election and “a classic demonstration of ‘devotion to democracy.’”118
Moreover, the Court has not distinguished referenda as
constitutionally different under the “one person, one vote”
principle.119 Rather, as in representative elections, the
constitutionally significant factor is whether “all citizens are
affected in important ways” by the referendum.120 While there has
been a recognition that the “discrete” nature of a decision subject to
a referendum will render some principles in representative
elections of “limited importance,” this merely results in potential
“one person, one vote” violations being more easily identified. 121
In evaluating the fairness of elections, the factual background
and potential effects to the disenfranchised or diluted electorate
will certainly be of paramount importance and thereby render some
analogies less potent than others. However, with such a varied
background of cases, lessons must be taken from wherever they
apply. Instead, the fact that most distinguishes the voting process
for National Register historic districts is that the make-up of the
referendum does not come from a local decision, even though it is
an election taking place at the local level.122 Unlike every other
case, this is a function of the federal government rather than a local

115. National Register of Historic Places, 46 Fed. Reg. 56183, 56186 (Nov.
16, 1981).
116. National Register of Historic Places, 84 Fed. Reg. 6996 (proposed Mar.
1, 2019) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 60).
117. See Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 673, 678–79
(1976).
118. See id. (quoting James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 143 (1971)).
119. See City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 209 (1970); Cipriano
v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 705–06 (1969).
120. City of Phoenix, 399 U.S. at 209.
121. See Lockport v. Citizens for Cmty. Action at the Local Level, Inc., 430
U.S. 259, 266 (1976).
122. See 36 C.F.R. 60.6(b)–(d).
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election tailored by local policy makers or through a state
instrumentality. 123
B. Federal Use of the Proprietary Model Conflicts with Principles
of Federalism
Federalism is the very bedrock of our governmental system, yet
federalism is an elusive concept in many ways. The Supreme Court
has strongly recognized federalism but has often struggled to
demarcate its enforcement on laws that bring state and federal
powers into dispute.124 This difficulty is particularly true for local
governments—while federalism contemplates only realms of state
and federal sovereignty, local governments must necessarily be
situated somewhere in the overall conceptualization of stratified
government structure.125
In the Court’s jurisprudence, this
recognition is often implicit, yet it is undeniable. 126 Such is the case
for the rationale that underpins the proprietary model because the
Court’s recognition of the need for such a model draws on federalist
principles.127
Furthermore, the National Register itself is an exercise in
federalism. A federal construct, the National Register program has
largely been delegated to SHPOs in its administration, particularly
with respect to the objection process. 128 This delegation is only
natural because SHPOs and state review boards are more
competent to make on-the-ground evaluations and oversee any
objections because they have proximity to the physical and political
landscape. As a result, officials at the state and local level largely
deal with the practical implications and are the target of any debate
or contention over the listing of the property on the National

123. See id.
124. Compare Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 854–55 (1976),
overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth. 469 U.S. 528 (1985)
(limiting federal interference in spheres of traditional state government
function), with Garcia, 469 U.S. at 550–52 (declaring federalism exists in the
structure of our government itself and cannot be judicially enforced).
125. See Michael Q. Cannon, Comment, The Dual-Faceted Federalism
Framework and the Derivative Constitutional Status of Local Governments,
2012 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1585, 1585 (2012).
126. See id. at 1585–86.
127. See infra Section III.C.
128. TYLER ET AL., supra note 11, at 77–78.
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Register.129 SHPOs may be held politically accountable to the
ridicule that the program produces, despite their inability to
deviate from a federally mandated framework. SHPOs are
understandably concerned because the land-area voting scheme
would depart from existing statutory language and obligate
enforcement of a democratically unequal voting scheme.130
Therefore, the proprietary model should be evaluated in terms of
both its federalist justifications and its implications on the National
Register program.
C. The Proprietary Model’s Creation Relied on Federalist
Principles
“One person, one vote” decisions, from the earliest extension of
the principle to local elections in Avery, have repeatedly recognized
the need for localities to have the ability to tailor functions of
government to suit their peculiar needs.131 While the Court never
129. An example of this is the years-long controversy over the listing of the
proposed Eastmoreland Historic District in Portland, Oregon. See Sophie Peel,
Eastmoreland Historic District Nomination Rejected by National Park Service,
Again, WILLIAMETTE WEEK (July 24, 2019), https://www.wweek.com/news/
city/2019/07/24/eastmoreland-historic-district-nomination-rejected-bynational-parks-service-again/ [https://perma.cc/6HUT-8Z6B].
Due to
uncertainty of how to count property owners within the proposed district,
particularly after an effort by some objectors to split their properties into
thousands of separate trusts that the Oregon SHPO initially counted as
individual votes, the nomination has repeatedly ping-ponged between the
SHPO and the NPS. See infra note 206. While it is dubious whether those
trusts count as individual votes, or even whether they were validly created, see
infra note 206, the result is that the Oregon SHPO is stuck between two highly
partisan neighborhood groups at the local level and the NPS at the national
level, see Sara Roth, Eastmoreland residents who split homes into shares
successfully halt historic district, KGW (Apr. 25, 2018, 12:28 PM),
https://www.kgw.com/article/news/local/editors-picks/eastmoreland-residentswho-split-homes-into-shares-successfully-halt-historic-district/283-545736598
[https://perma.cc/6DLK-DFQ5].
130. See TEX. HISTORICAL COMM’N, Comment Letter on National Park
Service Proposed Rule for the National Register of Historic Places (Apr. 9,
2019),
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=NPS-2019-0001-3304
[hereinafter Texas Commission Comment]; NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE
HISTORIC PRESERVATION OFFICERS, Comment Letter on National Park Service
Proposed Rule for the National Register of Historic Places 3 (Apr. 19, 2019),
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=NPS-2019-0001-0978
[https://perma.cc/3N69-3V7C] [hereinafter NCSHPO Comment].
131. See, e.g., Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 485 (1968) (“The
Constitution does not require a uniform straitjacket binding citizens in
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explicitly referenced federalism, examining the proprietary model
alongside the principles of federalism clearly illustrates that the
local needs supported by the proprietary model correspond to the
same benefits afforded to states and localities in our federal
system. 132 These advantages include, among others, a “sensitivity
to diverse needs,” an “increase[d] opportunity for citizen
involvement in democratic processes,” and an “allowance for more
innovation and experimentation in government.”133 All of these
principles justify localities escaping from the strictures of the “one
person, one vote” principle where there is a need to diversify,
experiment, and favor a unique democratic process where
singularly local issues are being resolved.
Yet with the proposed land-area voting scheme for National
Register historic districts, it is not the local citizens acting to tailor
the voting process to their needs and sensibilities; rather, it is a
federal agency acting wholesale for the purported benefit of
property owners in an incommensurable variety of local contexts.
While such voting processes for local historic districts could
potentially fit the proprietary model, particularly where the
decision carries regulatory consequences,134 this escape from the
voting protections of “one person, one vote” was never meant to be
a loophole for the federal government to avoid its own governing
principle of “one person, one vote.”135

devising mechanisms of local government suitable for local needs and efficient
in solving local problems.”); Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 56 (1970)
(recognizing the potential for election of “certain functionaries whose duties
are so far removed and so disproportionately affect different groups that a
popular election in compliance with [“one person, one vote”] might not be
required . . . .”).
132. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (citing Michael
McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV.
1484, 1491–1511 (1987)). Professor Briffault views the “proprietary” model as
a “partial escape from the tension between political equality and federalism,”
allowing local governments to be considered business entities, but they must
nonetheless be situated somewhere in the federal system. See Briffault, supra
note 7, at 381.
133. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458 (citing McConnell, supra note 132, at 1493).
134. See Texas Commission Comment, supra note 130, at 1 (noting that
some municipalities allocate votes for establishing local historic districts on lot
size).
135. Even in Ball v. James, where the proprietary model arguably reached
its zenith, the Court made clear that it was only examining the applicability of
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In addition, the Court’s analysis also demonstrates a reliance
on federalism concerns in crafting the democratic-proprietary
paradigm in other ways, particularly in the education context,
where the Court relied on the traditional governmental functions
at issue as proof that the powers wielded by the elected entities
were general in nature and widely affected all constituents.136 In
turn, the Court contrasted the fact that water districts did not
engage in traditional governmental functions in crafting the
proprietary model.137 This type of analysis reflects a line of
jurisprudence that endeavored to create spheres of state and
federal power based on defining traditional government
functions.138 In the context of “one person, one vote,” the exercise
of traditional governmental functions ironically justifies federal
interference rather than the protection of state power from that
interference, as with other uses of this analysis. 139 However, the
Court, relying on differentiating special-purpose districts based on
traditional governmental functions, suggests the creation of a
conceptual sub-state entity that, by its uniquely local and
proprietary nature, justifies further insulation from federal
control.140 This result comports with the recognition that, while

the “one person, one vote” principle to “local government bodies.” 451 U.S. 355,
357 (1981) (emphasis added).
136. See Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 56 (1970).
137. See Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410
U.S. 719, 728–29 (1973) (“[The water district] provides no other general public
services such as schools, housing, transportation, utilities, roads, or anything
else of the type ordinarily financed by a municipal body.”).
138. See Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976), overruled
by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth. 469 U.S. 528 (1985)
(invalidating the extension of federal minimum wage pursuant to the
Commerce Clause to certain government positions because federalism
guaranteed states freedom to “structure integral operations in areas of
traditional governmental functions.”).
139. See id. at 851–52.
140. See Cannon, supra note 125, at 1585, 1591–93, 1599–1600.
Traditionally, local governments have been viewed as merely state
instrumentalities, and not independent polities. See Hunter v. City of
Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 177–78 (1907). However, in Avery, the Court rejected
the argument that this theory justified a categorical exception of local
governments from “one person, one vote,” instead it recognized that they do
enjoy a great deal of autonomy. See Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474,
481 (1968); see also Briffault, supra note 7, at 347–48. A return to this theory
of local government does not fully explain the proprietary model, rather, it
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the federal government is justified in invading state spheres to
protect fundamental liberties to a great degree, the “Fourteenth
Amendment does not override all principles of federalism.” 141
While the Court has disavowed efforts to shape judicial review
based on bright-line formulations of governmental or proprietary
functions,142 values of federalism are nevertheless relevant where
federal law impinges on the exercise of state sovereignty.143
Fundamentally, the proprietary model rests on a need for
states and localities to have the freedom necessary to craft political
functions to address local needs and fit local predilections. In local
special-purpose elections, the Court seems to acknowledge the
importance of crafting additional voting requirements, which have
been recognized as a legitimate component of state sovereignty,144
despite such an action being rejected where it conflicts with the
democratic model under the “one person, one vote” principle.145
The Court made this exception for proprietary elections because, on
examining of the peculiarities of a special-purpose district with
disproportionate impact on certain voters, it recognized that the
favored group is clearly not, in fact, similarly situated or as
interested in the election as those who are excluded from an equal
appears to endorse the existence of another, more locally unique and businesslike, political subdivision. See Briffault, supra note 7, at 369.
141. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 469 (1991) (examining a variety
of contexts where deference is given to states in the exercise of “politicalfunction[s].”).
142. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550
(1985) (“[T]he principal means chosen by the Framers to ensure the role of the
States in the federal system lies in the structure of the Federal Government
itself.”). Although there are certainly competing theories of how federalism
should be enforced, as a practical matter it proved too difficult for courts to
define what is and what is not a traditional governmental function. See
Briffault, supra note 7, at 381 n.166.
143. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458, 469.
144. See Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621, 632 (1904) (“[T]he privilege to vote
in a state is within the jurisdiction of the state itself, to be exercised as the
state may direct, and upon such terms as to it may seem proper, provided, of
course, no discrimination is made between individuals in violation of the
Federal Constitution.”); see also U.S. CONST. art. I § 4 (“The Times, Places, and
Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be
prescribed in each State by the legislature thereof; but the Congress may at
any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of
chusing [sic] Senators.”).
145. See Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 625–26, 633 (1969).
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franchise.146 By distinguishing elections in the proprietary model
from those in the democratic model, the Court returns the power
for states and localities to craft voting requirements to its full effect.
Because the proprietary model rests on a sphere of sovereignty
reserved to states,147 the case for a federal exercise of the
proprietary model is further undercut.
Even if the federal government can properly utilize the
proprietary model, the Court has stated that the federal
government can only invade an area of state sovereignty if Congress
makes clear its intent to do so in a “plain statement.”148 However,
the language of the statute unequivocally states that a historic
district nomination will be blocked only by “a majority of the owners
of privately owned properties within the district.”149 Therefore, the
proposed land-area voting scheme is not even a permissible
construction of an ambiguous provision, but, rather, a direct
contradiction to the plain language of the statute. Such an invasion
of state sovereignty where Congress did not authorize it clearly
violates the “plain statement” rule.150
Furthermore, because the SHPOs would enforce this voting
scheme against their own democratic principles, the proposed rule
is arguably an impermissible commandeering of state officers to
enforce a federal regulatory scheme.151 Although federal grants
largely fund SHPOs, a change to such an important mechanism as
the nomination of historic districts would affect the fundamental
character of the historic preservation program. This is particularly
true considering the constitutional dimension of acting against the
fundamental right to vote under the Equal Protection Clause. The
ramifications and disapproval for administering such an
undemocratic system will undoubtedly fall upon the SHPOs and
allow the federal officers who devised it to escape them. As such,
146. See Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410
U.S. 719, 728–29 (1973).
147. See supra Section III.B.
148. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460–61.
149. 54 U.S.C. § 302105 (b) (2019) (emphasis added).
150. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460–61.
151. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 575–80 (2012);
see also NCSPHO Comment, supra note 130, at 3 (“[The land-area voting
scheme] essentially affords a more significant voice to those possessing more
wealth in the form of land⎯a rather feudal concept, and one that has been
introduced with no justification.”).

2021]

HISTORIC PRESERVATION

225

the proposed rule is especially capable of a coercive influence if the
states are not given a legitimate voice.152 Additionally, the
administration of the land-area voting scheme is an unfunded
mandate that would likely prove highly burdensome due to the
difficulties in reliably measuring land area, even if the proposed
rule or statute defined the term “land area” at all.153 Considering
the unwarranted and fundamental change to the voting scheme
along with the administrative burdens it represents, the proposed
rule can be fairly characterized as a coercion of the states.
When examining the rationale that created the proprietary
model alongside accepted principles of federalism that the Court
endorsed, it becomes clear that this model was contemplated only
to apply to states and localities that tailor their democratic system
to meet the peculiarities of local issues. Furthermore, to the extent
that principles of federalism are determinative to the exercise of
federal power in spheres of state sovereignty, there is evidence that
a federal agency’s use of the proprietary model is improper. Even
when applying more concrete doctrines of federalism-based
limitations, there is ample justification to hold the application of
the land-area voting scheme as violative of our nation’s federalist
structure. However, it is not entirely clear that National Register
historic district elections would fit the proprietary model at all if
this use of federal power were permissible.
D. Historic District Referenda Do Not Fit the Proprietary Model
While the Court was not entirely clear in delineating the test
to determine the line between the democratic and proprietary
models, some lessons can be pulled from the existing jurisprudence.
First, it must be determined whether the election involves general
governmental powers or is only for a special limited purpose.154

152. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. at 578 (“Permitting the Federal
Government to force the States to implement a federal program would threaten
the political accountability key to our federal system.”).
153. Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, Comment Letter on
National Park Service Proposed Rule for the National Register of Historic
Places 5 (Apr. 26, 2019), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=NPS-20190001-1806 [https://perma.cc/CHC4-C2VT] [hereinafter ACHP Comment].
154. See Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410
U.S. 719, 728 (1973).

226 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:199
Some factors to consider are the scope of the decisions to be made155
and whether the powers are those local governments traditionally
exercise.156 Second, it must be determined whether the election
and its contingent benefits and burdens disproportionately impacts
the favored voting class.157 To justify diluting a group’s voting
rights, the voting scheme must overcome a presumption that all
citizens are “affected in important ways” 158 and effectively
apportion the franchise based on a valid representation of the
interests of each group.159 Whether the entity can be characterized
as proprietary in nature is of particular importance.160 Finally, if
these factors favor an escape from the strict scrutiny of “one person,
one vote,” there must be a rational basis to show the unequal voting
scheme does not “nonetheless amount . . . to invidious
discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.”161
While this test is certainly not perfect due to the inconsistent
manner in which the Court has weighed different factors, 162 it is a
workable formulation for applying the “one person, one vote”
jurisprudence to the National Register historic district elections.
Indeed, commentators have struggled to nail down an analytical
framework that provides consistent guidance and, instead, have
opted to compare and contrast individual cases.163 Yet, the purpose
of this Comment is not to critique the efficacy of this line of

155. Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 484 (1968).
156. See Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 56 (1970).
157. See Salyer, 410 U.S. at 728–29.
158. See City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 209 (1970).
159. See Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 632 (1969); see also
Salyer, 410 U.S. at 734 (“[T]he benefits and burdens to each landowner . . . are
in proportion to the assessed value of the land.” (quoting Salyer v. Tulare Lake
Basin Water Storage Dist., 342 F.Supp. 144, 146 (1972))).
160. Briffault, supra note 7, at 372.
161. See Town of Lockport v. Citizens for Cmty. Action at Local Level, Inc.,
430 U.S. 259, 268 (1977).
162. See Joseph Seliga, Democratic Solutions to Urban Problems, 25
HAMLINE L. REV. 1, 13–14 (2001).
163. See, e.g., id.; Briffault, supra note 7, at 370–73, 375–76. Professor
Briffault posited that the disproportionate impact prong may be logically
circular, as the competing interests that are favored in the franchise will
necessarily depend on whether the vote is viewed from a democratic or
proprietary lens. See id. at 370–71.
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jurisprudence but to instead apply the available guideposts to a
discrete voting scheme.
1.

General Governmental Powers Versus Special Limited Purpose

It is self-evident that National Register historic districts do not
exercise the kind of broad powers that the quintessential local city
or county council would. The listing of a historic district will not
result in the various decisions, such as taxation, contracting, and
spending, that were at issue in Avery.164 As with all referenda, the
result of the election will be a single discrete decision. Facially, a
National Register historic district seems to have only a special
limited purpose. The Court has nevertheless recognized that such
special purpose elections may have wide enough impact to require
adherence to “one person, one vote.”165
In the bond referenda cases, the Court noted that increased
taxation would have wide impact both through direct government
services and with respect to costs passed from landowners;
furthermore, the disenfranchised also had a valid interest in the
election’s outcome.166 While the economic impact of a National
Register historic district listing is much harder to quantify than
with taxation, studies show that creating a historic district can
have a blanket impact on property values.167 In fact, there is
evidence that historic districts that do not impose property
restrictions, like the National Register, have a greater net benefit
even above the “conclusively” positive baseline land value
increase.168 Furthermore, the owners of properties that contribute
to the historical significance of the district can accrue direct
benefits in the form of federal tax incentives.169 Although each
164. See Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 483–84 (1968); see also
TYLER ET AL., supra note 11, at 71–72 (illustrating what listing on the National
Register does and does not do).
165. See City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 209 (1970); Cipriano
v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 704 (1969).
166. See Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. at 210–11.
167. See Paul K. Asabere & Forrest E. Huffman, Historic Districts and Land
Values, 6 J. REAL EST. RES. 1, 1 (1991); Donald A. Coffin, The Impact of Historic
Districts on Residential Property Values, 15 E. ECON. J. 221, 221 (1989).
168. Asabere & Huffman, supra note 167, at 5–6.
169. See Ejulius Adorno, Note, Historic Preservation: Incentivizing
Companies Through Tax Credits, 43 IOWA J. CORP. L. 143, 147–48 (2017)
(focusing on the federal rehabilitation tax credit); Jess R. Phelps, Preserving
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historic district is unique, there is no indication that these impacts
would not widely affect all property owners within a historic
district. Even where impacts are less defined, as other impacts of
historic district listing may be, the exercise of a traditional
government function can provide a guidepost.
The type of governmental power that underpins the creation of
a historic district is most readily characterized as a land use or
zoning function. While not among the traditional governmental
functions enumerated in Salyer,170 land use and zoning are
functions vital to local governments of general power. In fact, in
Board of Estimate of City of New York v. Morris, the Court applied
the “one person, one vote” principle to the election of a
governmental unit whose powers included land use and zoning171
and even extended to designating local historic districts. 172 This
application further suggests that zoning and land use fall within
traditional government function, despite the Board of Estimate’s
powers being broad enough to determine that it wielded general
governmental powers without needing to rely on the traditional
functions to show wide-spread impact. 173
Even when independently analyzed, zoning and land use
decisions are undoubtedly the kind that have wide impact on the
community. Indeed, there is an argument that the most important
power vested in local governments is control over land use
decisions, which is often reflected through the passionate discourse
over how these decisions will affect the future of a community.174
Zoning and land use decisions determine where citizens can live
and own property, run their businesses, send their children to
school, and even change the physical landscape of the community
writ large. A wider level of impact can scarcely be contemplated.
Perpetuity?: Exploring the Challenges of Perpetual Preservation in an EverChanging World, 43 ENVTL. L. 941, 961–62 (2013) (discussing the requirements
for the federal historic preservation easement tax deduction).
170. See Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410
U.S. 719, 728–29 (1973).
171. See Bd. of Estimate of City of N.Y. v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688, 695–96
(1989).
172. See Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 111
(1978).
173. See Morris, 489 U.S. at 695–96, 702–03.
174. Daniel P. Selmi, Reconsidering the Use of Direct Democracy in Making
Land Use Decisions, 19 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 293, 301–02 (2002).
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The decision to list a historic district on the National Register will
not have the same impact as local district zoning and land use
decisions. Nevertheless, that decision makes an important
statement about the values that property owners within the
proposed district hold, opens up an array of potential benefits to
property values, gives access to federal tax incentives, and provides
a template for further local decisions about the nature of the district
itself. 175
Despite indications of the wide impact from the decision to list
a historic district and its similarities to a traditional government
function, this factor may weigh more toward the election being for
a special limited purpose. Even where the Court has relied on
instances of a traditional government function to require “one
person, one vote,” the government entity often exercised additional
broader powers.176 Furthermore, the Court has most consistently
used this analysis in the context of education 177 and overlooked
seemingly vital government functions as incidental or nontraditional in other contexts,178 indicating that education may be a
special case. 179 To justify adopting the proprietary model, however,
evidence must also illustrate that the dilution of the franchise
corresponds to a disproportionate impact on the favored class of
voters.
2.

Disproportionate Impact

As the name of the proprietary model suggests, whether the
function of the election can be fairly characterized as a business––
with the favored voting group being entitled to a greater say over
its operation because they act as shareholders who bear the costs of
running the enterprise––is highly consequential. The importance
of this distinction was explicit in Ball’s exhortation that water

175. See supra Section I.A. and notes 167-69.
176. See Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 53–54, 56 (1970).
177. See, e.g., id. at 56. The Illinois Supreme Court continued to find the
democratic model applicable to school boards even after the development of the
proprietary model, relying once again on education as a “traditional and vital
government function.” Fumarolo v. Chi. Bd. of Educ., 566 N.E.2d 1283, 1296
(Ill. 1990).
178. See Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 368 (1981).
179. See Briffault, supra note 7, at 356.
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districts were “essentially . . . business enterprise[s].”180 This
distinction allowed a rebuttal of the presumption applied in
previous “one person, one vote” cases under the democratic model
that it was improper to exclude voters who also had valid interests
in the outcome of the election, despite the decisional autonomy of
water districts and the large number of affected residents in
Ball.181 The particularities of water district functions and the
corresponding valuation of costs being associated directly with the
size or value of the land owned within the district also gave
sufficient grounds to find that the unequal voting scheme reflected
the interests of each landowner in the relative weight of their voting
power.182 As a result, the associated pecuniary interests of each
landowner gave more reliable criteria for weighing each voter’s
interests and thereby circumscribes Kramer’s delineation of
“interest.”183
Elections over the listing of a National Register historic district
include none of these important distinctions. Certainly, a historic
district cannot be characterized as a proprietary entity because
property owners within the proposed district do not have a
proportional pecuniary impact or interest based on their
corresponding land holdings. For instance, the water district in
Ball had an acreage-based taxing power and funded its operation
through stock assessments, arguably requiring franchise power in
proportion to those real-world consequences.184 One may argue
that the land area of the proposed historic district itself, when
broken up among property owners, could act as the conceptual
“shares.” While it may be true that those with larger land might
generally accrue greater land value benefits, those benefits would
not be proportional to the overall land area but instead correlate to
the property’s characteristics, location, use, zoning, and other
factors.185 Furthermore, the Court has been clear in applying the
proprietary model that these distinctions must nevertheless
180. See Ball, 451 U.S. at 368.
181. See id. at 369–70.
182. See Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410
U.S. 719, 729–30 (1973).
183. See Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 632 (1969).
184. See Ball, 451 U.S. at 359–60.
185. See Asabere & Huffman, supra note 167, at 3–5; Coffin, supra note 167,
at 221–22.
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correspond to the functions of the district itself. 186 Nowhere is
there a function of National Register historic districts that would
justify a valuation of votes based on land area. Indeed, “land area”
is not a term within the authorizing statute or existing
regulation.187 In fact, its first introduction is in the proposed rule
itself. 188
Even accepting arguendo that property restrictions placed at
the state or local levels are implicated on the National Register,
they will not fall more heavily over one property owner than
another based on the land area involved. The restrictions
associated with local historic districts may limit demolition,
construction, repair, and renovation subject to review by a local
zoning board or historic district commission. 189 Such restrictions,
while potentially very onerous to the non-preservation minded
property owner, do not fall more heavily on property owners based
on the relative size of their property. The most likely way in which
these restrictions would fall more heavily on certain property
owners is where the property itself was more historically significant
or highly valued in the community, prompting greater scrutiny over
the treatment of the property. Yet, the National Register itself does
not even carry these burdens associated with locally designated
historic districts. 190
In fact, listing on the National Register is more fairly
characterized as not carrying any constitutionally significant
burdens on property owners at all. Although the research
necessary to prove a property’s historical significance often requires
a paid professional, because any person can nominate a property,
these costs do not necessarily even fall on the property owner, let
alone each property owner within a proposed district. Furthermore,
the few effects to property owners that can be characterized as
186. See Ball, 451 U.S. at 371 (“[T]he question [is] whether the effect of the
entity’s operations on [property owners is] disproportionately greater than the
effect on those seeking the vote.” (emphasis added)).
187. See supra notes 42, 52 and accompanying text.
188. See ACHP Comment, supra note 153, at 5.
189. Anika Singh Lemar, Zoning as Taxidermy: Neighborhood
Conservation Districts and the Regulation of Aesthetics, 90 IND. L. J. 1525, 1582
(2015). The most widely regarded principles governing the treatment of
historic properties come from the Secretary of Interior’s Standards for
Rehabilitation. 36 C.F.R. § 68.3(b).
190. See supra note 45–47 and accompanying discussion.
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drawbacks are incidental at best.191 In contrast, the benefits of
listing on the National Register, as previously discussed, may be
substantial and fall widely over all properties within the historic
district. 192 However, there is no evidence that either these benefits
or burdens—to the extent that they exist—fall more heavily on
larger property owners in proportion with the size of their land.
Clearly, the disproportionate impact prong weighs strongly in
favor of adherence to the “one person, one vote” principle to
National Register historic district elections. Although these
historic districts may likely be considered as having only a special
limited purpose, these two factors, on the balance, weigh towards
the land-area voting scheme being unconstitutional. That being
said, because of the inconsistent application of these principles in
the Court’s jurisprudence, it is difficult to predict the outcome
where the background is novel.193 However, even if the proposed
election scheme were to be permissible under the proprietary
model, there is yet an argument that it bears no rational relation to
the operation or aims of the National Register.
3.

The Land-Area Voting Scheme Under Rational Basis

Once an election is found to fit the proprietary model, the
unequal election scheme is valid so long as it is not “wholly
irrelevant to the achievement of the regulation’s objectives.”194
While the Court has always found a rational basis for justifying an
unequal election where it has found a proper use of the proprietary
model, it has also provided some basic guidelines to support a
rational basis. One consistent justification is that allowing the
dilution of some votes is grounded in the “realities” of the
underlying government unit or controversy.195 Additionally, the
voting requirements must still provide a reasonable relationship to

191. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 167–69 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 162–63 and accompanying text.
194. Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S.
719, 730 (1973) (quoting Kotch v. Bd. of River Port Pilot Comm’rs for Port of
New Orleans, 330 U.S. 552, 556 (1947)).
195. See Town of Lockport v. Citizens for Cmty. Action at Local Level, Inc.,
430 U.S. 259, 268–69 (1977); Salyer, 410 U.S. at 734, 268–69, 734 (1977).
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the operations of the underlying governmental entity or decision to
be made. 196
In both Salyer and Ball, the manner in which the votes were
weighted was based on how the costs were shared or the
corresponding benefits received, allowing the Court to find a
rational relationship to the voting scheme.197
The unique
challenges and needs of these water storage districts were the
realities that justified the creation of the proprietary model.198
However, no such realities exist with National Register historic
districts. If any group understands the realities of running our
nation’s historic preservation program, it is the SHPOs. Yet, when
this voting scheme was proposed, they were left baffled because it
was “unclear what problem this rule change is attempting to solve”
and there is “no justification” for smaller property owners’ votes to
be diluted as such.199 This confusion provides further support that
historic district listing does not, in fact, have any such burdens or
benefits that would justify finding even a rational basis.
Furthermore, in Ball, the Court held that weighing the vote
based on acreage bore a reasonable relationship to the overall
operation of the water district.200 Here, justifying the land-area
voting scheme by “emphasiz[ing] the rights of private property
owners within a proposed historic district” 201 has seemingly little
relation to the underlying operation of the National Register itself.
Instead, the concept that land area is the proper quotient for
valuing and measuring the rights of property owners within the
proposed district is arbitrary.202 And, what are the “rights” that
the land-area voting scheme are meant to “emphasize”? Under a
property theory, the form of ownership with the most rights in its

196. See Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 371 (1981).
197. See id.; Salyer, 410 U.S. at 734.
198. See, e.g., Ball, 451 U.S. 371 (basing the holding on the “narrow”
functions of the water district and its “relationship” to its “statutory
objectives”).
199. See NCSHPO Comment, supra note 130, at 3.
200. See Ball, 451 U.S. at 371.
201. Proposed Regulations on the Listing of Properties in the National
Register
of
Historic
Places,
NAT’L
PARK
SERV.,
https://www.nps.gov/subjects/historicpreservation/nhparegs2019.htm
[https://perma.cc/5AVX-N37A] (last visited Nov. 15, 2020).
202. See ACHP Comment, supra note 153, at 5.

234 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:199
proverbial “bundle of sticks” is fee simple. 203 Having a larger parcel
of land does not grant the owner greater rights than a smaller
neighbor, and it certainly does not grant him an entitlement to have
an outsized voice over how that neighbor wishes to exercise his own
rights.
By valuing a voter’s interest based on land holdings, with
seemingly little justification for doing so, the land-area voting
scheme conflicts with the conceptualization of a voter’s “interest” in
an election under Kramer, even under a rational basis test.204
Kramer defined interest in an election of community concern as
being something personal to the voter, not necessarily defined only
by pecuniary interest in the form of property ownership. 205 Only
through reframing the government entity as a business enterprise
could the Court narrow its definition of “interest” and thereby tie
that interest to the conceptual “shares” each landowner held.
Because the interest in the underlying proposed historic district can
scarcely be characterized as a proprietary one, it is not rational to
define a property owner’s interest in the election in this manner.
Instead, the land-area voting scheme allows for a large property
owner who simply receives notice that his property is located in a
proposed historic district and decides to object with a greater voice
than a property owner who is informed about local history and
wishes to celebrate and promote the community’s heritage.
CONCLUSION

The land-area voting scheme proposed for the nomination of
National Register historic district stands against our nation’s
fundamental principles of democracy. Such an election dilutes a
citizen’s fundamental interest in their right to vote, guaranteed
under the “one person, one vote” principle of the Equal Protection
Clause, by virtue of nothing more than their relative wealth in land
holdings compared to their neighbors. Although the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence allows some local elections to depart from the

203. See Katrina M. Wyman, In Defense of the Fee Simple, 93 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1, 12 (2017).
204. See Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 631–33 (1969).
205. See id. at 632; see also Briffault, supra note 7, at 355 (“[T]he Court’s
use of the term ‘interest’ . . . suggests that the relevant interests were
subjective states of mind, rather than objective ties to school board operations.”
(quoting Kramer, 395 U.S. at 630)).
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protections of “one person, one vote” by virtue of the special limited
purpose of the election and its disproportionate impact on the
favored voters, that proprietary model of local government is not
justified here. The proprietary model was not fashioned or
contemplated as a means for the federal government to violate its
own tenets. Instead, that model has its roots in principles of
federalism that justify state and local governments taking actions
that the federal government cannot. Furthermore, the use of the
proprietary model here runs afoul of federalism-based doctrines on
the division of state and federal power.
Even if federalism alone would not prohibit a federal agency’s
use of this model, the Court’s jurisprudence suggests that historic
district elections do not fit into the proprietary model and must be
examined under the strict scrutiny generally provided when
examining potential violation of the “one person, one vote”
principle. Even under a rational basis test, a disconnect exists
between the manner in which votes are apportioned and the
operation of the National Register program itself—demonstrating
that the dilution of the smaller property owner’s franchise is not
reasonably related to the justifications given.
While the existing one property owner, one vote election
scheme is not perfect,206 it represents the most reasonable process
under the particular circumstance of National Register
nominations. The voting qualifications to object require being a
landowner within the proposed district; however, the franchise is
still vested with the citizen—not the land itself—irrespective of the
relative size of each property. The same cannot be said for the
proposed land-area voting scheme, which flouts the foundational

206. One potential problem became clear in the 2017 proposal for the
Eastmoreland Historic District in Portland, Oregon. The objecting property
owners were able to defeat the listing, at least temporarily, by devising their
landholdings into thousands of separate trusts.
See Joy Beasley,
Memorandum on the Proposed Eastmoreland Historic District, Portland,
Oregon,
NAT’L
PARK
SERV.,
2
(July
18,
2019),
https://www.oregon.gov/oprd/OH/Documents/NPS%20
Return%20Letter%207.19.19.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ZFJ-YS48] (last visited
Nov. 15, 2020). While the Oregon SHPO and Department of Justice
determined that these trusts were valid for the purposes of the objection, the
NPS disagreed, and there is still a significant question as to whether the trusts
themselves were validly held, even if they could be considered individual
owners under the regulation. See id. at 3–5.
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principle in Reynolds that the right to vote is enjoyed by the
citizen.207
Therefore, the proposed land-area voting scheme should be
rejected as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, and elections
to determine the listing of historic districts to the National Register
must remain on a “one person, one vote” basis.

207. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).

